September 28, 2025Open Access

Dynamic Non-Bayesian Persuasion

Key Points

When the receiver deviates from bayesian updating, the sender's strategy may alter significantly, impacting outcomes.
In a two-step persuasion scenario under the $α$--$β$ rule, the sender can either gain or lose based on information timing.
Delaying information provision generally does not change the sender's ex-ante value, emphasizing strategic timing in persuasion.
Necessary conditions for effective persuasion relied on divisible updating rules and specific sender-receiver dynamics.

Abstract

We study a multi-step persuasion problem involving a Bayesian sender and a non-Bayesian receiver. When the receiver deviates from Bayesian updating, the sender may benefit from -- or be harmed by -- gradually revealing information over time. We show that under divisible updating rules (Cripps, 2018), delaying information provision does not affect the sender's ex-ante value. Focusing on the α--β rule of Grether (1980), we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the sender is strictly better or worse off under a two-step persuasion scheme.

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Cite This Study

Masao Kobayashi (Sun,) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/68d913a34ddcf71ba560b7f5 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2508.12328