We introduce an explicit construction for a key distribution protocol in the Quantum Computational Timelock (QCT) security model, where one assumes that computationally secure encryption may only be broken after a time much longer than the coherence time of available quantum memories.Taking advantage of the QCT assumptions, we build a key distribution protocol called HM-QCT from the Hidden Matching problem for which there exists an exponential gap in one-way communication complexity between classical and quantum strategies.We establish that the security of HM-QCT against arbitrary i.i.d. attacks can be reduced to the difficulty of solving the underlying Hidden Matching problem with classical information. Legitimate users, on the other hand, can use quantum communication, which gives them the possibility of sending multiple copies of the same quantum state while retaining an information advantage. This leads to an everlasting secure key distribution scheme over n bosonic modes. Such a level of security is unattainable with purely classical techniques. Remarkably, the scheme remains secure with up to O(nlog(n)) input photons for each channel use, extending the functionalities and potentially outperforming QKD rates by several orders of magnitudes.
Mazzoncini et al. (Wed,) studied this question.