Nuclear and Conventional Deterrence in Theory and Practice

Here, we focus on one of the most important yet understudied questions in international relations: Are nuclear weapons an effective deterrent that helps to prevent major powers conflict? This has been conventional wisdom and many scholars and policy makers have argued that the absence of global war after World War II has been the result of nuclear deterrence. We challenge this consensus on theoretical and empirical grounds and argue that deterrence strategies that rely on nuclear weapons and MAD are inherently dangerous and rest on assumptions that fail to account for the complexity of real-world crises. Conversely, the value of United States conventional weapons has been underappreciated and serves in two vital roles -- deterring conflict and enabling flexible punishment strategies. We examine the quantitative literature on nuclear deterrence and find that existing research is inadequate if we want to understand the role of conventional and nuclear weapons in deterrence. We conclude with a series of case studies to illustrate important and underdiscussed facets of deterrence, and discuss the implications for the current Russian invasion of Ukraine.