Research on time-of-use compensation pricing strategies for load aggregators based on user demand response

As the electric power market reform deepens, the strategic role of load aggregators in demand-side response becomes increasingly important. The inherent variability of distributed renewable energy generation and user demand response often leads to a mismatch between the purchased electricity and the market bid volume, resulting in punitive costs for companies. To address this issue, this study treats demand-side controllable loads as dispatchable resources and proposes a tiered pricing strategy to adjust power distribution. By establishing a Stackelberg leader-follower game model, the study promotes a mutually beneficial relationship between load aggregators and controllable load users. Through case studies, this paper examines the operational profits of load aggregators and the power adjustment behaviors of controllable load users under tiered and fixed compensation pricing schemes. The results indicate that tiered compensation pricing significantly reduces punitive costs and enhances user participation in demand response.