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Abstract Rousseau's conception of virtue is puzzling, for he sometimes defines virtue as self‐mastery and sometimes as patriotism. The prevailing Kantian interpretation emphasizes the first definition with its man‐citizen thesis, while attributing the latter to Rousseau's inconsistency. This article challenges this reading and argues that Rousseau intentionally operates with two conceptions of virtue: political virtue as love of fatherland and moral virtue as love of humanity. While the former relies on a state‐level amour‐propre that draws motivation from the division between nations, the latter hinges on conscience—an intelligent form of amour de soi —that reaches universal humanity. Underlying the two virtues is the irreconcilable tension between nature and politics. Where nature demands universal happiness incorporating all humans, politics necessitates passions that entail division. Retrieving Rousseau's dual conception of virtue highlights Rousseau's fundamental pessimism toward human politics, which has been blurred in the emerging Kantian‐liberal scholarship.
Shuhuai Ren (Mon,) studied this question.