Preparing for a Taiwan Contingency: Lessons for Japan from the War in Ukraine

Preparing for a Taiwan Contingency:Lessons for Japan from the War in Ukraine Michito Tsuruoka (bio) Former prime minister of Japan Shinzo Abe stated in December 2021 that "a Taiwan contingency is a contingency for Japan…It is also a contingency for the Japan-U.S. alliance. People in Beijing, particularly President Xi Jinping, should not misjudge that."1 Since then, it has become common for Japanese politicians and commentators to speak more freely and frequently about a potential Taiwan contingency and its impact on Japan. Given the geographic proximity between Japan and Taiwan, it is apparent that the Japanese must consider the impact that any crisis over Taiwan, particularly one involving the use of force, would have on Japan. Nevertheless, it had long been taboo—at least in the political realm—to discuss such matters. First, since Tokyo severed diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) and officially recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the legitimate government of China in 1972, it has acted as if Taiwan does not exist as either a political or security entity in the region. Tokyo pledged to "fully understand and respect" Beijing's position that Taiwan is an "inalienable part" of China.2 In part to avoid invoking Beijing's ire, most Japanese politicians have remained silent on Taiwan, particularly the political and security dimensions of this long-standing dispute, though Japanese trade and investment relations with Taiwan have developed steadily. Second, Japan's possible role in any Taiwan contingency, especially in the military domain, has been inherently limited because of the lack of legal basis for its direct involvement. Those in government understandably have not wanted to talk about what they knew their nation could not do. End Page 11 However, the context within which Japan's role and approach to Taiwan are contemplated is changing. This essay begins by examining the new strategic landscape that has forced Japan to think more deeply about a Taiwan crisis scenario and public perceptions thereof. It then analyzes Tokyo's evolving approach to a possible contingency over Taiwan, paying particular attention to the lessons Japan could draw from the ongoing war in Ukraine. The assumption here is that, while there is not necessarily a direct link between Russia's actions and those of China, Beijing is closely following events in Ukraine, and there are important lessons to be gleaned by Tokyo and other Asian middle powers in contemplating the growing prospects for a Taiwan conflict. A New Strategic Landscape and Japanese Perceptions Japan can no longer avoid discussing and preparing for a potential Taiwan contingency. First and foremost, the cross-strait balance of power has shifted considerably in favor of China over the past decade, leading some American officials and experts to warn that, in terms of capability, Beijing will be able to conduct a major military operation against Taiwan to unify the island by force as early as 2027.3 The expansion of naval, air force, and missile capabilities of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) have been accelerating at an alarming rate, and it is becoming increasingly harder for Taiwan, even with U.S. support, to keep pace. President Xi Jinping has repeatedly made clear that "reunifying" Taiwan with the mainland is his ultimate objective, and Beijing has refused to rule out the use of force to achieve that goal. Addressing the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2022, for instance, Xi stated, "We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary."4 As a result, a new situation is emerging where both the capability of the PLA and Beijing's willingness to conduct a military operation against Taiwan will soon be in place. Although this does not mean that China will necessarily invade Taiwan, countries in the region End Page 12 and beyond will need to prepare themselves for this potentiality, given its significant ramifications. A cross-strait invasion by the PRC would present a particularly grave challenge to Japan, owing to its proximity...