Psychological Continuity as an Ontological Criterion of the Subject’s Personal Identity

In the current article the author considers the problem of the subject’s personal identity. The analysis of this concept seems to be very relevant, since in today’s public space the concept of identity is used, firstly, as non-problematic, and, secondly, as completely politicized. The analysis of the concept of identity is important because philosophy can look at the subject’s identity without prejudice and thereby depoliticize its concept. And ontology as a branch of philosophy is able to carry out a truly fundamental and comprehensive research of the concept of the subject’s identity. Personal identity turns out to be an ontological concept because the subject exists as identical to itself, and consistent reflection on the modes of existence of the subject inevitably leads us to discover the concept of its identity. The subject of the article is the subject’s personal identity. On the basis of philosophical methodology and on the method of historical analysis, the author of the study considers personal identity as something non-self-evident, placing it in the conceptual framework of subjectivity proposed by Levinas. The personal identity of the subject is endowed with the status of a mediator, smoothing out the collision of the same and the other. In this research, human identity appears as both a space and the result of a collision of familiar experience and new impressions – in the terminology of Levinas – identical and different. The temporal structure of the subject’s identity is revealed. The concept of an ontological criterion of personal identity is put forward and four historical concepts that offer such a criterion are considered: Locke, Hume, Kant and Parfit. Thus, four ontological criteria are found – consciousness, memory, transcendental criterion and psychological continuity. Each criterion is analyzed, integrated into the ontology of the subject’s personal identity and the role of each criterion is traced in the organization of its temporal structure. The results of the research are the reconstruction of the discovered concepts in the status of ontological criteria of personal identity, their comparative analysis is carried out. It is concluded that Parfit’s psychological continuity is the most consistent of all the analyzed criteria because it simultaneously affirms the possibility of the subject’s personal identity and outlines the boundaries of the application of this concept. Though psychological continuity doesn’t fit in Levinas’ conceptual frame because it doesn’t solve existential and ontological problems, that exist around concept of personal identity.