Epistemic Injustice in Deliberative Mini Publics

The foundational principles of deliberation rest on citizens meeting as political and moral equals. If we take them seriously, we need to consider the exclusion that arises from power asymmetries. These can lead to some groups being absent from decision-making processes, but often they are excluded even when they are present. This exclusion can be conceptualised as internal exclusion, which is the way in which some people—typically members of marginalised groups—speak and are heard and believed less in political communication. In this article, I make two claims. First, I argue that we should distinguish two kinds of internal exclusion: symbolic and epistemic. While symbolic internal exclusion describes the way in which some groups are greeted and acknowledged differently than others, epistemic internal exclusion happens when some people are believed and heard less. I will argue that the latter conception can be fleshed out most productively with theories of epistemic injustice, as this body of work considers the specifically epistemic dimension of systems of oppression. To illustrate the benefits of this approach, I will apply it to deliberative mini publics, which are becoming increasingly institutionalised and consequently have a greater influence on public policy. The three design features I discuss are group composition and facilitation, agenda setting and choice of experts, and the relationship between rhetoric and persuasion. I will show how the epistemic internal exclusion perspective helps to analyse and identify the aspects of deliberative practice that exclude marginalised groups from influencing the discussion and the outcomes fairly.