Deterrence and Foreign Election Intervention: Securing Democracy through Punishment, Denial, and Delegitimization

Abstract Democratic elections are under threat from foreign interference. Democracies around the world are experimenting with a range of responses, from threatening potential interveners with a variety of retaliatory punishments to bolstering election security, scrutiny, and counter-interference operations, and leveraging multilateral institutions to reinforce norms of behavior and rules of engagement. At their root, many of these approaches are anchored to the logic of deterrence, compellence, and denial. Surprisingly, however, scholars and practitioners have paid scant attention to how contemporary approaches to countering foreign election intervention (FEI) fit within the larger framework of deterrence theory and practice. Our article reframes existing contemporary responses to FEI within the unifying context of fifth-wave deterrence scholarship, an emerging subtext of research on coercion with a penchant for all-domain observations, interdisciplinarity, and sub-threshold challenges that bridge the divide between national security and public safety. By exploring FEI within the context of contemporary deterrence, we sharpen our collective understanding of the phenomena and how best to respond. Our analysis encourages a more nuanced understanding of adversaries’ cost–benefit calculations in deciding whether, when and how to intervene in elections, and, crucially, helps identify the tools, technologies, infrastructures, and processes needed to manipulate an adversary's calculus and preferences. In doing so, we gain a better sense of the conditions under which states can deter FEI all the while securing national elections.