“The Day After”—Initial Reactions of Haredi Society to the Israel-Hamas War

"The Day After"—Initial Reactions of Haredi Society to the Israel-Hamas War Nissim Leon (bio) Keywords October 7, Israel, Hamas, Haredi Society, Haredim, Civil Burden, Labor Market A major topic of Israeli public discussion since war erupted on October 7th between Israel and Hamas is that of "the day after." From day to day the question has expanded across many different planes, including the social plane, where the case of Haredi society is of particular note. Many Israelis, including Haredim, are wondering whether the war is capable of significantly altering the model of insularity and separatism on which the Haredi community operates. Against the background of the war, can we detect indications that pockets of change and integration in the Haredi community are widening? Will it be possible to talk about an accelerated Israelization of the Haredim? It is still hard to form a clear idea of what the future holds based on the war and the Haredi response to it. What can be said is that dissatisfaction among the Haredi community's pockets of change and integration is translating into extensive action from the ground up that challenges the community's insular and isolationist norms. For now, this action is indicative of something that has been discussed at conferences on Haredi society in Israel, namely, the gap that has been evident for nearly a decade between politics and society, between the leadership and the community as a whole. This gap is also broadly evident in non-Haredi Israeli society, but in the case of the Haredim it demands particular attention in light of prevailing assumptions regarding the crushing power of the Haredi spiritual and educational leadership. But caution is required: the aforementioned dissatisfaction does not constitute a "revolt" against Haredi religious values. The impression one has is that a Haredi version of national and civil solidarity End Page 122 is emerging—a version that is not severed from the overall framework of Haredi belief and opinion, but is nonetheless openly present among a large and diverse public within the Haredi mainstream.1 Is this a trend that will persist into the future? Or is it merely another episode of solidarity along the lines of those sparked by earlier events? It is hard to say. "Haredism," it should be recalled, is not just an ideology but also an entire way of life, with cultural habits, institutions, life-cycle milestones, social rewards, and more or less fixed life scripts, some of which, if not beyond question, are in any case regarded as binding traditions. I The question of "the day after the war" and the Haredi community cannot be considered in isolation from a widely-circulated forecast emanating from the Israeli policy-studies domain, namely, that within two decades, or perhaps a little more, 25% of Israeli citizens, and fully a third of Israeli Jewish citizens, will be Haredi.2 This is a critical mass with real potential to alter the fabric of Israeli life. Given that the Haredi education systems still operate on the traditional unsupervised basis and are far from having incorporated study subjects relevant to modern life, Israel's future, certainly with respect to the economic and civil burden borne by the middle class, is uncertain. This is not due merely to the unequal burden of military conscription, owing to political arrangements that defer compulsory service for many young Haredim until they become exempt, but to the situation's economic outcomes. Many young Israeli Haredim are ideologically and legally barred from integrating in the labor force in an orderly manner and at a young age, with the requisite years of training; certainly they cannot participate in the more advanced segments of the labor market. What this means, according to scholars and policymakers, is that within two decades or slightly more, unless the dominant Haredi life model undergoes meaningful change, the modern way of life in Israel as a whole will be disrupted. A quarter of the nation's populace will be characterized by a religiously devout, ultra-conservative, non-modern way of life, in which the individual political will on fateful matters is vested in an authoritarian leadership. Under these circumstances, the potential integration of a...