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Focusing on the escalation of environmental protests amid worsening pollution in rural China, this study examines the responses of grassroots authorities to environmental protests. Through an analysis of several cases, it reveals that grassroots leadership suppresses, mediates, and sometimes even leads these movements. Accordingly, I raise the following questions: (1) How does China’s grassroots leadership respond to environmental protests? (2) Why does it choose to lead them? To answer these questions, this study posits local cadres as actors intending to maximize their self-interest within conflicting incentives, reaching the conclusion that under certain conditions, leading a protest can be a better option for their cost-benefit considerations. I argue that the varying behaviors of local cadres are contingent upon two crucial factors: (1) the degree of economic benefits derived from polluting companies; and (2) the degree of social unrest resulting from environmental protests. These factors are pivotal in shaping the economic and political interests of local cadres that influence their responses toward environmental activism.
YEJU KANG (Fri,) studied this question.