Debates in the foundations of physics have long been characterized by strikingly persistent unre- solved problems. This paper advances the thesis that at least part of this persistence is not due to missing physical mechanisms, but to a systematic conflation of different levels of description. On the basis of a functional-logical analysis, the concept of conditions of applicability of physical description is introduced and explicitly distinguished from both ontological entities and purely conventional stipulations. Building on this distinction, a framework of levels of description is developed, differentiating between a pre-physical level of applicability clarification, a theoretical level of formal models, and a physical-descriptive level of empirical application. The central claim is that certain explanatory demands in physics are structurally unsatisfiable because pre-physical conditions are implicitly treated as objects of physical explanation. Using the quantum-mechanical measurement problem as a controlled exemplar, the paper shows that the demand for a physical mechanism producing definite measurement outcomes constitutes such a misaddressing. The methodological contribution of the framework lies in the explication of structural limits of physical explanation and in the diagnosis of persistent foundational debates. Unlike prior approaches that focus on theory-relative constitutive principles, this framework identifies conditions that remain invariant across any conceivable physical theory.
Zierhut et al. (Sun,) studied this question.