This article presents a comparative legal study of the institution of the special prosecutor in national criminal proceedings. Its subject is the body of legal norms governing the participation, in the criminal prosecution of senior state officials, of a person standing outside the ordinary prosecutorial apparatus — in circumstances where that apparatus finds itself in an institutional conflict of interest. The study examines four national models: the American, which took shape in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal and was codified in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978; the South Korean, grounded in the Special Prosecutor Act of 2014 with its dual regime — general and special; the Icelandic, which provides for the appointment of a special prosecutor by the Director of Public Prosecutions; and the Japanese, embodied in the permanent special investigation divisions of the public prosecutors' offices. Particular attention is given to the relationship between the national institution of the special prosecutor and the institution of the prosecutor amicus curiae in international criminal law. The methodological foundation of the study comprises the comparative legal, historical legal, and formal juridical methods of inquiry, applied to the legislation and law enforcement practice of the states under examination. For the first time in Russian legal scholarship, a comprehensive comparative analysis of the special prosecutor institution is undertaken, identifying two models of its organisation: the temporary (extra-systemic), characteristic of the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Iceland; and the permanent (systemic), represented by the Japanese special investigation divisions. It is established that the choice of model is determined by the degree of public confidence in the law enforcement system and the prevailing political conditions within a given state. The article advances the conclusion that the very emergence of such an institution bespeaks either an insufficient political maturity of society or an instability of state institutions. A structural affinity is identified between the institution of the special prosecutor and the institution of the prosecutor amicus curiae at the international criminal tribunals: both are appointed by the court, both carry a temporary mandate, and both owe their existence to a conflict of interest on the part of the ordinary organ of prosecution. Prospective avenues for further research are outlined, including an analysis of the influence exerted by national models upon international criminal law and an assessment of the effectiveness of each of the two identified models.
Ekaterina Alekseevna Kopylova (Sun,) studied this question.