This study investigates contract design and channel coordination in live-streaming e-commerce under uncertain product fit and return risk. We develop a game-theoretic framework comparing three return-cost allocation mechanisms—the Influencer-Bearing Contract (IBC), Manufacturer-Bearing Contract (MBC), and Shared Responsibility Contract (SRC)—to examine their effects on consumer surplus, social welfare, and the profits of manufacturers and influencers across different levels of consumer sensitivity and matching probability. We show that when matching probability is high, the SRC contract delivers the highest consumer surplus and overall efficiency, whereas the MBC contract is optimal only under exceptionally strong consumer responsiveness. When matching probability is low, concentrated liability (IBC or MBC) dominates shared liability (SRC) by providing stronger effort incentives. We further extend the model to incorporate influencer reputation and a hybrid online-offline channel. The reputation extension shows that dynamic concerns strengthen effort incentives without altering the main contract rankings. In the hybrid setting, manufacturers benefit only when consumer travel costs exceed a threshold, while influencers consistently gain because offline inspection reduces expected returns without diminishing commissions. A pilot empirical vignette based on live-streaming data from a leading automobile brand provides contextual support for the incentive mechanisms highlighted in the model. Overall, the findings reveal that risk-sharing does not always enhance welfare and that full liability can sometimes better align incentives, offering managerial guidance on contract selection, channel design, and the strategic role of influencer effort in mitigating return-related risks.
Chen et al. (Sun,) studied this question.