Abstract This article critically examines the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear decision-making processes and its implications for deterrence strategies in the Third Nuclear Age. While realist deterrence logic assumes that the threat of mutual destruction compels rational actors to act cautiously, AI disrupts this by adding speed, opacity and algorithmic biases to decision-making processes. The article focuses on the case of Russia to explore how different understandings of deterrence among nuclear powers could increase the risk of misperceptions and inadvertent escalation in an AI-influenced strategic environment. I argue that AI does not operate in a conceptual vacuum: the effects of its integration depend on the strategic assumptions guiding its use. As such, divergent interpretations of deterrence may render AI-supported decision making more unpredictable, particularly in high-stakes nuclear contexts. I also consider how these risks intersect with broader arms race dynamics. Specifically, the pursuit of AI-enabled capabilities by global powers is not only accelerating military modernisation but also intensifying the security dilemma, as each side fears falling behind. In light of these challenges, this article calls for greater attention to conceptual divergence in deterrence thinking, alongside transparency protocols and confidence-building measures aimed at mitigating misunderstandings and promoting stability in an increasingly automated military landscape.
Luba Zatsepina (Wed,) studied this question.