Abstract This article challenges the view that war and interdependence are inherently incompatible by examining how combatants manage collective institutions during conflict. Using the internet as a case of such an institution, we show that belligerents selectively preserve or disrupt mutual access based on battlefield conditions. Disruption is more likely during mobile offensives, which offer greater operational freedom, while static or constrained operations incentivize maintaining interdependence for co-ordination, intelligence, or deception. Drawing on geolocated data from internet outages in the Russia–Ukraine war (2022–3) and qualitative evidence from this conflict and the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflicts (2020, 2023), we find that the disruption likelihood declines as battlefield constraints increase. These findings reveal how interdependence can serve as a tactical asset rather than merely a casualty of war. This has important implications for understanding the relationship between institutions and conflict, as wartime strategies shape not only battlefield outcomes but also prospects for post-war peace building.
Kostyuk et al. (Thu,) studied this question.