Italy as a "key case" in the reform of the European Union's migration and asylum policy (2015-2024)

The migration crisis of 2015–2016 revealed structural dysfunctions in the Common European Asylum System, primarily the asymmetric distribution of responsibility for examining applications for international protection under the Dublin System. The concentration of migration flows at the external borders of the EU led to a disproportionate burden on first-entry states and called into question the effectiveness of existing solidarity mechanisms. The object of the research is the transformation of the migration and asylum policy of the European Union during the period from 2015 to 2024. The subject is the institutional, regulatory, and political factors that determined the nature of the reform culminating in the adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum in 2024. The aim of the article is to analyze the evolution of this reform using Italy as a “crucial case”, combining the role of a border state with that of an active EU political actor. The methodological framework includes historical-political analysis, the comparative legal method, and case study. The choice of Italy is due to a combination of institutional development, sustained migration pressure, and its dual role as both a border state and a political actor in the EU. It is shown that integrating four dimensions of analysis—institutional-legal, securitization, externalization, and solidarity—allows an explanation of the hybrid, rather than redistributive, nature of the final reform. The New Pact strengthens operational and compensatory mechanisms (border procedures, screening, and the expansion of the mandates of agencies) but maintains the link between responsibility and the place of entry and does not eliminate the structural contradiction between responsibility and solidarity. The model of “flexible solidarity”, enshrined in the Pact, reflects a compromise in which member states retain significant freedom to choose the form of participation, thus limiting the redistributive potential of the reform. The case of Italy demonstrates that the political initiatives of states at the external border—from the hotspot approach to agreements with third countries—substantially influenced the formation of the final architecture of the Pact.