This article analyses the evolutionary recalibration of India’s national security doctrine vis-à-vis Pakistan, examining how the state navigates the complex tension between sub-conventional provocation and nuclear deterrence. It explores the challenge posed by the adversary’s asymmetric warfare strategy, which sought to exploit the ‘stability–instability paradox’—where strategic nuclear stability is leveraged to foment tactical instability—thereby constraining India’s conventional options. Rather than positing a radical rupture, the study argues that India’s transition from ‘strategic restraint’ to the current ‘new normal’ represents a sophisticated adjustment within the framework of defensive realism. By reflecting on a series of punitive measures culminating in Operation Sindoor, the article demonstrates how the Indian state has matured in its ability to manage the escalation ladder. The central argument posits that this calibrated posture aims to restore credible deterrence through limited punitive strikes, validating indigenous defence capabilities while exercising the strategic maturity necessary to prevent conflict from spiralling into a nuclear exchange.
Tej Pratap Singh (Fri,) studied this question.