Love and the Basis of Dignity

Abstract It is often said that dignity is the ground of human rights. But what grounds dignity? According to proponents of the metaphysical view , dignity is grounded in our rational capacities, our sense of justice, or a disjunctive list of valuable capacities. According to a rival political view , dignity is grounded in our evolving social practice of treating one another as equals or the simple political commitment to act as if we were one another's equals. I argue that both views face serious objections. I then consider a recent alternative proposal, the relational view , and argue that we should reject it because it fails to offer an answer to the question: what grounds dignity? In its place, I argue that we should adopt a different sort of metaphysical view—call it Naïve Humanism—which says that being loveable necessarily entails being valuable, and that all human beings are fit to love in a distinctive sort of way and are thus essentially valuable in a distinctive sort of way, possessing a dignity. I conclude by considering a methodological disagreement and suggesting a way forward for all participants in this debate.