Evaluation Processes, Local Cadres' Behaviour and Local Development Processes

This study investigates the impact of political evaluations on the behaviour of leading county and township cadres in rural China. The article is structured in two parts. In the first section the institutional foundations of the evaluation system for local administrations in rural China will be introduced. The section will conclude with a brief overview of policy reforms initiated by the centre to tackle some of the perceived shortcomings of the present system. The second part of this article will feature the behavioural responses of local cadres to evaluations as identified in our field research interviews and secondary literature. It becomes obvious that the performance evaluation system and its targets have become an important point of orientation for local cadres—although there are important variations among different groups of officials. Finally, in the conclusion the argument for an alternative perspective on performance evaluations in the context of rural China will be developed: on the one side a channel for specialised political communication, steering cadres' behaviour and promoting an incentive system; on the other side a trigger to a multitude of social responses of leading local cadres. In the end these social responses might have more influence on cadre behaviour than the incentives embodied in the evaluations themselves.