Being realistic and demanding the impossible

The greatest artist does not have any concept Which a single piece of marble does not itself contain Within its excess, though only A hand that obeys the intellect can discover it. Michelangelo Buonarroti Fidelity to the facts in political theory is often associated with a conservative slant, or at least a tendency to prefer incremental reformism to radicalism. Political realism—both in its classical manifestations and its contemporary revival1—is frequently linked to that tendency. For instance, in recent works we read that realism can lead to a “collapsing of the space for serious challenges to major social and political institutions (Markell, 2010, p. 176), that “the closer political theorists are to politics the more their own judgment and frailties will be tested” (Philp, 2012, p. 646), and that “realism will inevitably tend to nudge us towards a greater acceptance of the status quo, towards more modesty in the change that we are prepared to propose or demand” (Finlayson, 2017, p. 271). In this article I resist those claims, and contribute to the project of reclaiming the radical potential of political realism (Brinn, 2019; Cross, 2019; Honig McKean, 2016; McQueen, 2016; Prinz, 2016; Raekstad, 2016; Prinz Freeden, 2012; Hamlin Horton, 2017; Miller, 2016; Mills, 2005; Rossi, 2016; Valentini, 2012; Wiens, 2012). That, however, this not true of all forms of realism. In fact, after briefly characterizing realism in the next section, I move on to distinguishing between ordorealism, contextual realism, and radical realism. I then show how each approach draws on different sources of normativity and, relatedly, exhibits fidelity to a different set of facts about politics. I associate ordorealism with the prioritization of peace and stability, contextual realism with practice-dependent norms, and radical realism with a form of ideology critique. I then contrast realism with nonideal theory and discuss utopianism and the prospects for a radical realism. I characterize a version of radical realism with a distinctive epistemic normativity, which has radical potential that surpasses what is found in moralist political theory and also opens a new option in the debate on the status of normativity in Marxism. That is because, while radical realism avoids potentially ideological moralizing, it can inform open-ended social critique as well as lend support to concrete forms of prefigurative politics. To be sure, that is not sufficient to establish the superiority of realism to moralism, and not even to identify the all-things-considered best form of realism. My aim here is more modest: I want to show that, pace some critics (Erman Estlund, 2017; Leader-Maynard Scheuerman, 2013), contemporary realism is a distinctive and consistent position in normative political theory, and that at least one of its variants does not suffer from a status quo bias—rather, it is as radical as it gets. Moral philosophy sets the background for, and the boundaries of, political philosophy. What persons may and may not do to one another limits what they may do through the apparatus of a state, or do to establish such an apparatus. (Nozick, 1974, p. 6) While that approach remains prevalent in contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy, realists claim that no overarching that and politics are That may to in the of if there are true overarching moral about the greatest for the greatest or means that they to any of the of is politics or we to our political in a or even The realist is that the of there are any such the and the we will discuss in the next at least they are to political or That is not to that are for political 2017, p. for are not a of overarching political on the sources of normativity as moral That is realists that there are no overarching such overarching moral then at least a of normative political theory be a of realists can show that they can normative political that on overarching and so the sources of normativity of moral then they will have for their may that the of overarching moral the that politics be by moral moral that only to the political 2017, p. That is a realists are not overly concerned with are to p. What is that realist normative one may to not from pre-political or The in of the of overarching moral the realist about the normative of the be by this if political we have politics. I want to between in support of this each of which to a different of ordorealism, contextual realism, and radical realism. about that are in my here to show how moralism, but to the realists may those are ideal from more than one of the I no about any of the I to about their has a which first political “the of and the of p. The is that, to their own their own with so that judgment itself may be to a or are not in a way of this as they may be through which political us to that we need a of political normativity if there is to be for other of how not the of is not of some moral to the of political but because it is a for the of of what we to to be or p. is a about the of political such it is an and one that true in the 2012; that are on or about social change than theory. in that is to from the status we have that realism and nonideal theory one we may that, as they have to feasibility are nonideal theorists of realism. The contextual realist will have for radical social through a of the and institutions at hand A practice-dependent approach is by to but the to which that a status quo bias on the of the is in a addressing this (Erman the radical realist will be to the from to transformative will be by an of how in and so it will on the best social-scientific accounts of those but that no limits on our to critique and our to those any and for our the radical realist has no need for feasibility That is not to that all status quo bias from feasibility constraints, but all status quo bias to fidelity to the facts realists can demand the is in but not by status quo bias. that that radical realists can that is with no to and us that it is and even to do so Estlund, be an if radical realism found itself with one may in My is that realists can that do not feasibility but other to the of political two forms of which we may and ideological that in the any of of which the has no For the of a even in its there a of of of with which no will radical realism is and so while it can the political of feasibility constraints, it is of it the of that an of The realist can be and but be to those to there are of politics not to The of ideological moralism is the way of the on their status quo bias is to from its on and, to a that the best for from facts from the of our normative the we on the more we on moral do the that To see a potential for bias there one have to with on the of are not to often ideology with an of the true of our and our 2012, p. it to that, as many and our moral and moral in some way to our if only because, it may is one of the we are in The radical realist is that the possibility of is a for a form of critique that is both radical and to the The first version of this prepared for a on realism by at the of in I from with the and there and, the the of and Political the of at the of and the of and for those I also the many with I those Cross, McQueen, Raekstad, and A version of the for a of and has a version is in While the and of the are the the position I has in major My by a for my project is an associate of political theory at the of the of the of Political and the of the project has on political realism and