…fix it until it is. I learned that operational philosophy shortly after I started a job with the US Government. From September 1992 through February 2003, I had the pleasure of working at the US National Science Foundation (NSF) as a Program Director in the Division of Environmental Biology. I worked primarily in the Ecology and Long Term Ecological Research (LTER) programs, until I was appointed as the first Program Director for the National Ecological Observatory Network (NEON), at a time when the Directorate for Biological Sciences was struggling to secure Congressional funding for this new observatory concept. Essentially, I was a Program Director with a single portfolio and no budget, but a lot of paperwork. Shortly after I switched positions from NSF to the University of New Mexico, Congress started to appropriate funds for NEON. I often wonder whether the latter event was contingent upon the former. For anyone who is naturally cynical, working for the federal government is a great way to reinforce that personality trait. My experience as a fed taught me that higher-level federal administrators often had a desire to fix things that “ain’t broke.” In early 2025, as the second Trump administration got underway, the Department of Government Efficiency (DoGE) took a sledgehammer to the federal workforce, including NSF, forcing many employees to quit, retire, or be fired. As a consequence, the ~1800-strong NSF workforce lost nearly 500 of its employees, equivalent to a ~30% reduction. Similar degrees of downsizing were implemented across the federal scientific enterprise. According to the American Institute of Physics’ FYI: Science Policy News, more than 15,000 employees at federal science agencies left their jobs in 2025. Among its other impacts, DoGE largely gutted one of the NSF's former strengths: the use of temporary Program Directors known as “rotators.” By spending one to two years working alongside career (permanent) staff, rotators brought expert knowledge and experience from the scholarly community to the agency. To some extent, rotators provided a mechanism to help ensure that the agency's funding decisions aligned with the interests and needs of the broader research community. This was important because career Program Directors can develop perspectives that do not always reflect the needs of the research community that depends on NSF funds. DoGE pretty much eliminated the rotator positions throughout most of the Foundation. Other federal science agencies and programs received similar DoGE (mis)treatment. On the brighter side, Congress continued to provide strong bipartisan support for science and basic research by essentially protecting the research budgets of NSF (and other agencies) from huge (57%) proposed funding cuts. However, with a reduced workforce, the NSF is now struggling with workload issues, including a backlog of submitted research proposals. The agency must responsibly allocate the same amount of research funding with 30% fewer people to do the work. Of course, the five-week government shutdown (October 1 to November 12) did not help, nor did NSF's bookended announcements of the eviction from its building (June 25) and of a massive internal reorganization (December 15). It is now abundantly clear that the reckless approach of DoGE, despite its name, actually resulted in widespread inefficiency. Notwithstanding this chaos, the communications from NSF management remain professional and positive, as one would expect. In response to the proposal review backlog and staff reductions, NSF management decided to change how staff oversee the grant-review process. For example, to reduce the burden on Program Directors, NSF decreased the minimum number of outside reviews required to make a funding decision from three to one, and reduced the use of review panels. Also, regarding decisions to fund or not, NSF determined that very little information about how that decision was made needed to be conveyed to prospective investigators. When paired with the greatly reduced number of rotators, these actions place more power into the hands of the agency's career scientists. That is not necessarily bad, but it is dramatically different from how NSF worked in the past. Hopefully these changes will be temporary, just to alleviate the backlog. No one ever liked getting their research proposal declined but at least investigators received five to seven evaluations along with more specific guidance to help with the preparation of future submissions. Most people grudgingly acknowledged that the pre-2025 NSF process worked. However, because of the above-described changes, there is now widespread concern about how well research proposals will be evaluated and how funding decisions will be made. Of course, Program Directors retain the option to seek additional outside reviews, and I hope many will do so whenever possible. During my time inside the DC Beltway, I met a lot of people at NSF and other government agencies who understood their obligation to the public. They did not want to waste taxpayer dollars. Despite what some politicians may say, the majority of the federal scientific workforce does its job responsibly and conscientiously. None of this is to imply that the pre-2025 system was perfect. Certainly, improvements are needed. But those changes should be thoughtful, constructive, and based on evidence. It is essential that members of the research community, especially early career scientists and cynical former federal employees like me, have confidence that NSF's evaluation process and funding decisions will continue to be rigorous, objective, and fair. So, the next time something “ain’t broke” at the NSF, maybe don’t fix it until it is.
Scott L Collins (Mon,) studied this question.
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