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Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 Richard A. Meserve, Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 6 March 2002, in Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes: The Terrorist Nuclear Threat (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), pp. 8–11, http: //frwebgate. access. gpo. gov/cgi-bin/getdoc. cgi? dbname=107ₛenateₕearings Steven E. Koonin, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 6 March 2002, in Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes, pp. 19–21. 10 Zimmerman and Loeb, Dirty Bombs, pp. 6–10. 11 Ibid. , p. 9. 12 Although past research has touched upon these sorts of attacks, there has been no systematic survey of their potential effects – or even an appreciation of their effectiveness as a weapon of terror. Koonin, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, p. 20 and Zimmerman with Loeb, Dirty Bombs, p. 5, have flagged the danger posed by aerosolised radioisotopes. Michael A. Kelly and Henry C. Levi, 'Weapons of Mass Disruption', Scientific American, November 2002, p. 80, have also discussed them – but in the context of the increased risk of cancer that could result from the inhalation of radioactive material following a dirty-bomb attack. Moreover, there are similarities between radiological emission devices (a hidden radioactive source designed to irradiate passers-by) discussed by Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector and Fred Wheling, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (London: Routlege 2005), p. 259, and the immersion scenarios presented here. 13 Bodansky, Nuclear Energy, pp. 30–31. 14 Jesse Helms, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 6 March 2002, in Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes, p. 6. 15 Gregory J. Van Tuyle and Evelyn Mullen, Large Radiological Source Applications: RDD Implications and Proposed Alternative Technologies, LA-UR-03-6281 (Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2003), p. 1. For other examples see T. Biro, 'Uncertainties in the Assessment of the Radiological Impact of Radiological Dispersion Devices', in IAEA, Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Towards a Global System for the Continuous Control of Sources throughout their Life Cycle, Bordeaux, France, 27 June–1 July 2005 (Vienna: IAEA, 2006), pp. 571–80, http: //www-pub. iaea. org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1262web. pdf; and Donald D. Cobb, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 6 March 2002, in Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes, p. 18. 16 Kelly, Prepared Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate. 17 There are, of course, important differences between dirty bombs and nuclear explosions. The temperature in a chemical explosion is much less than that of even a small nuclear explosion and the energy release is orders of magnitude smaller. The fireball from a dirty-bomb explosion is therefore less effective at lifting radioactive material to high altitudes where winds are unaffected by buildings and terrain. 18 Apart from Dhiren Barot, Jose Padilla was also accused of plotting to manufacture and detonate a dirty bomb. These charges have, however, been dropped. See Abby Goddnough, '2 Sides Give Opening Arguments in Padilla Trial', New York Times Online, 14 May 2007, http: //www. nytimes. com/2007/05/14/washington/15cnd-padilla. html? ex=1180843200 Ricardo Wray and Keri Jupka, 'What Does the Public Want to Know In the Event of a Terrorist Attack Using Plague? ', Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science, vol. 2, no. 3, July 2004, pp. 208–18; Steven M. Becker, 'Emergency Communication and Information Issues in Terrorist Events involving Radioactive Material', Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science, vol. 2, no. 3, August 2004, pp. 195–207. 31 Baruch Fischhoff, 'Assessing and Communicating the Risks of Terrorism', in Albert H. Teich, Stephen. D. Nelson and Stephen J. Lita (eds), Science and Technology in a Vulnerable World (Washington DC: AAAS, 2002), pp. 51–64; Baruch Fischhoff, Wändi Bruine de Bruin, Wendy Perrin and Julie Downs, 'Travel Risks in a Time of Terror Judgements and Choices', Risk Analysis, vol. 24, no. 5, October 2004, pp. 1301–09. 32 Rogers et al. , 'Mediating the Social and Psychological Impacts of Terrorist Attacks'. 33 Carol S. Fullerton, Robert J. Ursano, Ann E. Norwood and Harry H. Holloway, 'Trauma, Terrorism and Disaster', in Robert J. Ursano, Carol S. Fullerton and Ann E. Norwood (eds), Terrorism and Disaster: Individual and Community Mental Health Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 1–21; Carol. S. North, 'Exploring the Myths of Coping with a National Trauma: A Longitudinal Study of Responses to the September 11th Attacks', in Yael Danieli, Danny Brom and Joe Sills (eds), The Trauma of Terrorism: Sharing Knowledge and Shared Care, An International Handbook (New York: The Haworth Maltreatment and Trauma Press, 2005), pp. 143–55. 34 IAEA, The Radiological Accident in Goiâna (Vienna: IAEA, 1998), p. 36. 35 Fullerton et al. , 'Truama, Terrorism and Disaster'. 36 Eurobarometer 59, Spring 2003, p. 9, http: //ec. europa. eu/publicₒpinion/archives/eb/eb59/eb59ᵣapportfinalₑn. pdf. 37 Paul Slovic, Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters and Donald G. MacGregor, 'Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about Affect, Reason, Risk and Rationality', Risk Analysis, vol. 24, no. 2, 2004, p. 311. 38 Peter W. Beck, 'Nuclear Energy in the Twenty-First Century: Examination of a Contentious Subject', Annual Review of Energy and the Environment, vol. 24, 1999, pp. 113–37; Malcolm Grimston and Peter Beck, Double or Quits: The Global Future of Civil Nuclear Energy (London: Earthscan, 2002), pp. 1–237; Rogers et al. , 'Mediating the Social and Psychological Impacts of Terrorist Attacks'. 39 Simon Wessely presentation at the Health Protection Agencies conference, 'Polonium-210: The Public Health Response', 27 March, 2007, the Royal College of Surgeons, London, http: //www. hpa-events. org. uk/hpa/templates/sub/titem. csp? pageID=8253 Paul Slovic, 'Beyond Numbers: A Broader Perspective on Risk Perception and Risk Communication', in Deborah G. Mayo and Rachelle D. Hollander (eds), Acceptable Evidence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 48–65; Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff and Sarah Lichtenstein, 'Perceived Risk: Psychological Factors and Social Implications, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, A376, 1981, pp. 17–34; Yasumasa Tanaka, 'Psychological Dimensions of Risk Assessment: Risk Perception and Risk Communication', Progress in Nuclear Energy, vol. 32, no. 3–4, 1998, pp. 243–53. For a full description of the social amplification of risk framework see C. W. Trumbo and Shanahan, 'Social Research on Climate Change: Where Have We Been, Where We Are, and Where We Might Go', Public Understanding of Science, vol. 9, 2000, pp. 199–204; Nick Pidgeon, Roger E. Kasperson and Paul Slovic, The Social Amplification of Risk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 55 Slovic, 'Perception of Risk'; Slovic, 'Beyond Numbers'; Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff and Sarah Lichtenstein, 'The Psychometric Study of Risk Perception', in Vincent T. Covello, Joshua Menkos and Jeryl Mumpower (eds), Risk Evaluation and Management (New York: Pienum Publishing Corporation, 1986), pp. 3–24. Additional informationNotes on contributorsJames M. Acton James M. Acton is a lecturer in science and security in the Department of War Studies at King's College London. Prior to commencing this position he was the science and technology researcher at the Verification, Research Training and Information Centre. He holds a PhD in theoretical physics from the University of Cambridge. M. Brooke Rogers M. Brooke Rogers is a Research Fellow in the King's Centre for Risk Management at King's College London. A social psychologist by training, specialising in the study of social groups, group interaction, attitude formation and change, and belief systems, she holds a PhD in the Psychology of Religion from Royal Holloway, University of London. Peter D. Zimmerman Peter D. Zimmerman, a nuclear physicist, is Professor and Chair of Science & Security at King's College London. He was chief scientist of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, science adviser for arms control at the US State Department, and the last chief scientist of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He has a PhD in physics from Stanford University.
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