The article examines the dynamics and nature of aerial warfare during the Nigerian Civil War, 1967—1970. It shows how the warring parties were preparing for an air war. The head of the Federal Government, Yakubu Gowon, failed to obtain supplies of aircraft from Western countries and turned to the USSR and Czechoslovakia, which sold MIG-17 jet fighters to Nigeria, as well as UTI MIG-15 and L-29 training aircraft. In 1968, the United Arab Republic (UAR) provided Nigeria with Soviet-made IL-28 bombers. The Biafran Air Force was established from scratch in a short time. The separatists used a wide range of not always legal methods to get aircraft: buying decommissioned French Air Force bombers through frontpeople and grey schemes, seizing Nigerian airplanes stranded in Eastern Nigeria, hijacking planes flying in West Africa, and “confiscating” helicopters from Western companies producing oil in Eastern Nigeria. As a result, by the beginning of the war, the Biafran Air Force had two B-26 Invader short-range bombers, two Fokker F-27 and Douglas DC-3 passenger transport planes adapted for manual bombing, and three French-made Alouette helicopters. The combat missions of aviation in Nigeria and Biafra have been analyzed. They turned out to be similar: support for the offensives of their ground forces, the destruction of enemy aircraft, manpower and military infrastructure, primarily airfields. Since the end of 1967, when the International Red Cross (ICRC) and a number of charitable organizations organized the delivery of humanitarian aid to Biafra by air, the priority task of the federal aviation had been the air blockade, preventing the supply of weapons and military materials to the separatist army under the guise of civilian cargos. The main feature of the air war in the skies of Nigeria has been identified: it was a war without aerial combats, military pilots shot down only one plane, and that civilian, chartered by the ICRC. Losses of aircraft occurred due to accidents or as a result of their destruction by enemy aircraft at airfields. The stages of the air war have been highlighted: the dominance of the Biafran Air Force at the beginning of hostilities, retaliatory strikes by federal aviation since August 1967. In May 1968, the Biafran Air Force practically ceased to exist, all aircraft were destroyed or captured by the Feds. For a year and a half, Nigerian aviation dominated the air, until, through the efforts of Swedish Count Gustav von Rosen, a squadron of Swedish-made MFI-9B light single-engine aircraft was established and began operating successfully on the Biafran side in August 1969. Subsequently, American-made T-6 Texan single-engine aircraft were added to them. It has been established that most of the flight personnel of the Nigerian and Biafran Air Forces were foreigners. Documents from Russian archives made it possible to confirm the fact itself and determine the nature of the participation of Soviet pilots in the Nigerian conflict.
Sergey Mazov (Wed,) studied this question.