What question did this study set out to answer?

The central aim is to argue against propositionalism by demonstrating that moral laws should be viewed as generative relations rather than mere propositions.

April 24, 2026

Against Propositionalism About Moral Laws

Key Points

The central aim is to argue against propositionalism by demonstrating that moral laws should be viewed as generative relations rather than mere propositions.
Developed an argument against propositionalism in metaethics.
Introduced a relational alternative framework for moral laws.
Analyzed the implications of this view on non-naturalism and metaphysical explanation.
Demonstrated that propositionalism leads to an explanatory regress in moral explanation.
Established that moral laws as generative relations avoid this regress and maintain their explanatory role.
Clarified the relationship between moral laws and metaphysical explanations, contributing to non-naturalism.

Abstract

ABSTRACT Propositionalism, the view that moral laws are propositional, is nearly a truism in metaethics. Against this, I argue that those who hold that moral laws play an ineliminable role in moral explanation should reject it. If laws are to play such a role, they must make what explains relevant to what is explained. Yet if laws are themselves propositions, this requirement yields an explanatory regress. I develop a relational alternative according to which moral laws are generative relations rather than propositions. This relational account avoids the regress, preserves the explanatory role of moral laws, and has significant implications for metaethical theory. In particular, I show that it yields a nontrivial formulation of non‐naturalism and clarifies the relation between moral and metaphysical explanation.

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