This paper analyses the role of the Venice Commission in the procedures of adopting and amending constitutions, starting from the classical theory of constituent power as an expression of popular sovereignty. It proceeds from the view that constitution-making has traditionally been understood as an internal matter of the state, but that, following the Second World War, the internationalisation of human rights and the strengthening of international institutions have led to an opening of constitutional processes to external influences. In this context, the Venice Commission is examined as an independent advisory body whose authority does not rest on legal binding force, but on expertise and institutional dialogue. The paper demonstrates that, although the Commission does not formally limit constituent power, it indirectly influences constituent processes through the development of procedural and substantive standards grounded in democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Particular attention is paid to the contemporary challenges facing its role in the context of a crisis of the international legal order.
Aleksandrar Cvetković (Wed,) studied this question.