ABSTRACT Ensuring trucking companies comply with hours‐of‐service (HOS) rules is an ongoing challenge faced by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. This research examines heterogeneity in how trucking firms' compliance with HOS rules changed in response to a multistage regulatory intervention that required most large commercial trucks operating in the United States to install electronic logging devices (ELDs). We extend theory by first drawing on deterrence theory to explain why carriers that utilize subcontractor truck drivers—called leased owner‐operators (LOOs)—saw greater reductions in HOS violations as the ELD mandate was more strictly enforced. We then augment deterrence theory with principles from regulatory compliance theory to explain why this two‐way interaction will be more pronounced for larger carriers, suggesting a three‐way interaction. We test our hypotheses using the population of inspections across for‐hire motor carriers from January 2013 through December 2023. Results from fitting a series of econometric models corroborate our predictions. These findings suggest important boundary conditions for existing theory regarding LOOs' compliance with HOS rules and help shed light on the complex interplay of forces that generate heterogeneity in compliance efforts.
Miller et al. (Tue,) studied this question.