Purpose This paper proposes a revenue allocation strategy based on contributions for shared manufacturing collaboration. The shared manufacturing collaboration is established, comprising a capacity supplier, a third-party shared manufacturing platform, and a capacity demander. Design/methodology/approach Differential game models are constructed to figure out the equilibrium solution for maximizing revenue, considering participants' dynamic strategies over time. The metrics of participating entities are determined by the attributes of shared manufacturing, including historical credibility, effort, and income contribution. The improved Shapley algorithm provides a contribution-based revenue allocation strategy. Findings The numerical results show that, compared with the standard Shapley algorithm, the proposed strategy increases the revenue shares of the third-party shared manufacturing platform and the capacity demander by 1.18% and 0.52%, respectively, while reducing the supplier's share by 1.70%. This indicates that the new algorithm improves the outcomes for parties with limited bargaining power in the shared manufacturing process. Originality/value This paper addresses revenue allocation in shared manufacturing cooperation by using differential games and an improved Shapley algorithm, thereby proposing a strategy that ensures fairness and rationality.
Cao et al. (Wed,) studied this question.