The promulgation of Nepal’s 2015 Constitution was widely hailed as a milestone in the attempt to institutionalise inclusive democracy after a decade of conflict and protracted transition. Its elaborate quota provisions—guaranteeing seats for Dalits, Janajatis, Madhesis, Tharus, Muslims and women across all three tiers of government—represent one of the most ambitious experiments in state-led recognition in the region. This article examines whether these quotas have produced merely strategic inclusion, designed to stabilise the polity and contain demands for federal autonomy, or whether they have fostered genuine democratic transformation. Drawing on electoral and legislative data, as well as interviews and fieldwork in selected provinces, the analysis distinguishes between descriptive and substantive representation. It explores how far quota representatives have been able to articulate community-specific claims, shape distributive outcomes, and challenge entrenched party hierarchies. The evidence points to a paradox: while quotas have succeeded in diversifying political assemblies, their transformative potential is often blunted by the centralised structures of party control and the depoliticisation of ethnicity under the rhetoric of “inclusive federalism.” Yet, at the local level, especially in Madhesh and Lumbini, there are signs of incremental change in areas such as health provision, education, and the recognition of minority languages. Situating Nepal in comparative perspective with other post-conflict federations, the article argues that quotas function less as instruments of empowerment than as negotiated bargains that preserve cohesion while opening limited spaces for voice.
Asis Mistry (Thu,) studied this question.