Raz on Legal Theory: Comments on Raz's “Can There Be a Theory of Law?”

Abstract This paper (appearing here for the first time in English) is part of a debate between Joseph Raz, Robert Alexy, and Eugenio Bulygin previously published in 2007 in Spanish by Marcial Pons and now featured in this special issue of Ratio Juris . In responding to Raz, Bulygin sets out his main points of disagreement with Raz on the question, Can there be a theory of law? Bulygin challenges Raz's view of legal theory as consisting of necessarily true propositions that explain the nature of law by picking out a set of essential properties independent of the concepts used to identify law. He argues, on the contrary, that the necessary or essential properties of a thing (and so of law) depend on the concept we use to refer to this thing (law), suggesting that legal theories accordingly yield a plurality of concepts rather than uncovering a single privileged concept of law.