What question did this study set out to answer?

This research aims to understand the dynamics of bargaining between stubborn and rational players and the effects of their demands on negotiation outcomes.

May 16, 2026Open Access

Optimally stubborn. How long to hold and who will fold?

Key Points

This research aims to understand the dynamics of bargaining between stubborn and rational players and the effects of their demands on negotiation outcomes.
Developed a model analyzing two types of players: rational and stubborn.
Examined two stages of the game: demand stage and concession stage.
Assessed how the probability of facing a stubborn player influences equilibrium outcomes.
When facing a low probability of a stubborn player, any feasible payoff can be negotiated for both types.
High probability scenarios result in either immediate agreement or prolonged negotiation delays.

Abstract

I consider a model of reputational bargaining in which the stubborn type can choose their initial demand. There are two types of players: rational and stubborn. The game has two stages: a demand stage and a concession stage. Types can pool or separate in equilibrium for any fixed probability of facing a stubborn type. When the probability of facing a stubborn type is small, any feasible payoff can be achieved in equilibrium for either type. When the probability is large, there is either immediate agreement or long delays.

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Cite This Study

Anna Sanktjohanser (Thu,) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a080a71a487c87a6a40c602 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3982/te5977

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