China: The Post-Responsible Power

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes1. Dingding Chen, Xiaoyu Pu, Alastair Iain Johnston, “Debating China's Assertiveness, ” International Security 38, no. 3 (Winter 2013/14), pp. 176–183. 2. Robert D. Kaplan, “Geopolitics and the New World Order, ” Time, March 20, 2014, http: //time. com/31911/geopolitics-and-the-new-world-order/. 3. See Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2011) ; Yong Deng, China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Rowman Tang Jiaxun Says China's International Status Raised to Unprecedented High in Past 13 Years, ” Xinhua, October 8, 2002, OSC: CPP20021008000155. 7. The quote from Clinton's National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, as relayed by Joseph S. Nye, “China's Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia–Pacific, ” Survival 39, no. 4 (Winter 1997–98), p. 76. 8. Joseph S. Nye, “The Case for Deep Engagement, ” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4 9, July/August 1995), pp. 90–102. 9. Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 107. 10. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds. , Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 11. James Shinn, ed. , Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996). 12. Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 148. 13. Pang Zhongying, “Zhongguo De Yazhou Zhanlue: Linghuo De Duobian Zhuyi” China's Asia Strategy: Flexible Multilateralism, in Niu Jun, ed. , Zhongguo Waijiao Juan China's Foreign Affairs (Beijing: New World Press, 2007), pp. 132–42; Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 119–128. 14. Wang Yizhou, Tanxun Quanqiu Zhuyi Guoji Guanxi Exploring International Relations from a Globalist Perspective (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2005), pp. 340–357. 15. Mark Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 16. Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin, “Introduction, ” in Yongjin Zhang and Greg Austin, eds. , Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy (Asia Pacific Press, 2001), p. 5. 17. U. S. Department of State archives, Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? ” delivered at the National Committee on U. S. –China Relations, September 21, 2005, transcript at http: //2001-2009. state. gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682. htm. 18. Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of ‘Peaceful Rise’, ” China Quarterly, no. 190 (June 2007), pp. 291–310. 19. Song Baoxian, “Changing ‘China Concept’ of U. S. Government and People, ” Renmin Ribao, June 23, 1998, p. 6, OSC: FTS 19980625001945. 20. Shen Dingli, “China and the United States Should Undertake Their Respective Responsibilities While Developing Their Relations, “Shanghai Dongfang Zhaobao (internet), March 23, 2007, OSC: CPP 2007041942400221. Jim O'Neill, Building Better Global Economic BRICs, Global Economics Paper No. 66, Goldman Sachs, 30 November 2001. 22. Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), http: //fpc. org. uk/fsblob/244. pdf. 23. Cui Peng, “Reminbi Exchange Rate Has not Been Undervalued!” Renmin Ribao online, July 28, 2010, p. 2, OSC: CPP20100728788003. 24. See, for example, Cao Xiaofan and Gu Yegang, “The ‘China Responsibility Theory’ is Unreasonable, has been Played up Groundlessly to Mislead Public Opinion, ” Xinhua, August 19, 2010, OSC: CPP20100819071002. 25. Yang Yi, “Caution, Engagement, ” China Security 3, no. 4 (Autumn 2007), pp. 28–38. 26. Nina Hachigian and Yuan Peng, “The U. S. -China Expectations Gap: An Exchange, ” Survival 52, no. 4 (August-September 2010), p. 82. 27. Commentary, “Keeping Vigilant against Rancorous Claim on China's ‘Greater International Responsibility’, ” Xinhua in English, September 26, 2010, OSC: CPP20100926968145. 28. Wang Haiyun, “Attacks on Libya by Some Western Countries are Absolutely Not an Act of Justice, ” Wen Wei Po online (Hong Kong), March 23, 2011, OSC: CPP20110323787006. 29. On China's disagreement with “the responsibility to protect, ” see Amitai Etzioni and G. John Ikenberry's exchange, “Point of Order: Is China More Westphalian Than the West, ” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 6 (November/December 2011), pp. 172–176. 30. Su Changhe, “‘Non-intervention in Domestic Affairs’ must not be Shaken, ” Jiefang Ribao online, April 25, 2011, OSC: 20110427666001, p. 2. 31. “Obama Labeling China as ‘Free Rider’ in Iraq Issue” China Daily, September 4, 2014, http: //www. chinadaily. com. cn/world/2014-09/04/content₁8543889. htm. 32. Dai Bingguo, “Jianchi Zou Heping Fazhan Daolu” Persist with the Road of Peace and Development, December 7, 2010, http: //news. xinhuanet. com/world/2010-12/07/c₁2856420₆. htm. For further elaboration, see Yang Yi, A Vision of China's National Security Strategy, chap. 2. Notably Yang Yi did not include South China Sea amongst the “core interests. ”33. Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China's Rise (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), pp. 76–77. 34. Zheng Bijian, “The Second Decade of the ‘Peaceful Rise’, ” Liaowang, March 21–27, 2011, No. 12, pp. 38–39, OSC: CPP20110330787004; Deng Yuan Interviews Wu Jianmin, Guoji Xianqu Daobao online, January 24, 2011, OSC: CPP20110124671006. 35. Renmin Ribao, People's Daily Overseas Edition (hereafter cited as RMRB), October 7, 2013, p. 4. 36. See David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 37. RMRB, November 16, 2013, p. 2. 38. Simon Denyer, “China promotes ‘Asia-Pacific dream’ to counter U. S. ‘pivot’, ” The Washington Post, November 11, 2014, http: //www. washingtonpost. com/world/chinas-promotes-asia-pacific-dream-to-counter-us-pivot/2014/11/11/1d9e05a4-1e8e-4026-ad5a-5919f8c0de8aₛtory. html, 39. Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000), p. 112. 40. Arnold Wolfer, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press. 1962), p. 245. 41. Yang Jiechi, “Innovations in China's Diplomatic Theory and Practice under New Conditions, ” in Mandarin, Xinhua, http: //news. xinhuanet. com/world/2013-08/16/c₁25179915₂. htm. 42. For a scholarly exposition of the Chinese thinking, see Yan Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement, ” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 2 (April 2014), pp. 153–184.