Synthetic biology/AI convergence (SynBioAI): security threats in frontier science and regulatory challenges

Abstract This article examines the convergence of synthetic biology and artificial intelligence (SynBioAI), focusing on co-evolving biosecurity threats as a novel security problem. Advances in genome-editing, CRISPR, AI-powered protein design, and automated biofoundries accelerate beneficial applications but also heighten risks, including the possibility of producing novel pathogens. Utilization of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and regime-complex theory is offered, emphasizing power in shaping governance. The key security problem this article identifies is the increasing ease with which AI enables biological engineering, lowering technical barriers and making biosecurity threats more intangible, diffuse, and decentralized, despite persistent barriers like tacit knowledge and wet bench realities. This article contributes to existing debates by analyzing technological trends and how existing regulatory patchwork is prospectively relevant for securing SynBioAI. It examines the Biological Weapons Convention, WHO, USA, China, EU and Tianjin Guidelines. It concludes that a multi-layered governance model—encompassing new forums, updated BWC guidelines, and broader stakeholder engagement—is necessary to balance innovation with security.