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Type of the article: Research ArticleAbstractShareholder voting in conventional corporate governance remains constrained by intermediated proxy systems, information asymmetries, and limited transparency. This study aims to systematically synthesize recent scholarly, legal, and policy literature to evaluate whether, and under what legal and institutional conditions, blockchain-based voting and decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) architectures can enhance shareholder democracy through hybrid “code-plus-law” governance models. Adopting an interdisciplinary qualitative design, the paper combines a systematic literature review with doctrinal legal analysis, drawing on a broad corpus of recent scholarly, legal, and policy sources published from 2020 through 2025. Evidence is synthesized into six structured comparative tables covering voting auditability, shareholder participation, token concentration, legal recognition, DAO design features, and hybrid “code-plus-law” governance models. The review highlights consistent improvements in three core dimensions compared to legacy proxy systems: enhanced auditability and end-to-end verifiability, speedier aggregation of voting outcomes, and broader feasibility of cross-border shareholder participation. Simultaneously, four risks keep appearing: token concentration (“whale dominance”), technical and governance scalability limits, unequal digital literacy and access, and persistent gaps in the legal recognition and enforceability of DAOs. Overall, the findings suggest that hybrid arrangements that combine blockchain-based transparency and efficiency with conventional legal safeguards are more apt to provide for inclusive participation and durable legitimacy than purely code-based or purely traditional governance models.
Moustafa et al. (Fri,) studied this question.