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Psychologists and philosophers have recently been exploring whether the mechanisms which underlie the acquisition of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) are best characterized as cognitive modules or as developing theories. In this paper, we attempt to clarify what a modular account of ToM entails, and why it is an attractive type of explanation. Intuitions and arguments in this debate often turn on the role of develop‐ment: traditional research on ToM focuses on various developmental sequences, whereas cognitive modules are thought to be static and ‘anti‐developmental’. We suggest that this mistaken view relies on an overly limited notion of modularity, and we explore how ToM might be grounded in a cognitive module and yet still afford development. Modules must ‘come on‐line’, and even fully developed modules may still develop internally, based on their constrained input. We make these points concrete by focusing on a recent proposal to capture the development of ToM in a module via parameterization.
Scholl et al. (Mon,) studied this question.
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