Two Problems with Ordinary Language Generalism

Abstract Some philosophers claim that, in ordinary language, when non-philosophers refer to ‘conspiracy theories’ such people take it that conspiracy theories are—in some sense— mad, bad, or dangerous . These philosophers then argue that academics interested in studying conspiracy theories should keep their operating definition close to that notion. I will challenge this by first arguing that whatever the ordinary language conception of ‘conspiracy theory’ might be, the notion that these philosophers are pointing to is at best contrary and at worst contradictory with their own work. Secondly—using the psychological literature as an example—I will show that academic non-philosophers do not seem interested in the folk or ordinary language notion of ‘conspiracy theory’ anyway. Thus the argument for what we might call ‘ordinary language generalism’—the position that generally it is recognised by users of ordinary language that there is something inherently mad, bad, or dangerous about conspiracy theories—fails. However, we can capture some of the intuitions behind ordinary language generalism by focussing on the kinds or sub-types of conspiracy theories that interest us.