Recovering Relativity

Raymond Aron talks of the historian as one who must 'project the uncertainty of the future into the past'. Collingwood thought of the history of philosophy as the 'reconstruction of a series of questions to which only the answers have come down to us'. We introduce these statements to provide a reference point for our arguments.' Presented in this way, many interpretations of them are possible, but it is not our intention to provide a textual exegesis: rather we hope that our arguments will stimulate reflection upon them, and generate supplementary readings.2 Barnes has recently suggested that 'the sociology of science is no more than a typical special field within the sociology of culture generally'.3 Whilst we would agree with this in a broad sense, the suggestion misses the particular and strategic importance of the sociology of science, an importance which derives from the role which canonical versions of scientific practice have been made to play in modern moral, political and methodological thought. For this reason the implications of a relativistic approach (such as that advocated here) may constitute not only a favourable heuristic for the sociology of science itself, but also force a further reconsideration of the role which science has played as a model for practice in the human sciences. We wish to defend 'sociological relativism'. Given the nature of our topic, a number of disclaimers are immediately in order. What follows is