Agha, shaikh and state: the social and political structures of Kurdistan

Kurds who did not actively fight identified themselves in one way or another with those who did. This was true, not only in Iraq, but also in other parts of Kurdistan. In terms of numbers, therefore, this was certainly a people's war, a peasant war comparable to the six that Wolf described in his major work on the subject (1969b). But whereas these six movements were progressive (the peasantry were mobilized, at least in part, on the basis of their class interests, against their exploiters; the movements were anti-imperialist and aimed at the abolition of social injustice), the Kurdish movement had, especially since 1966, a conservative, even reactionary appearance, in spite of the justness of its demands. The Kurdish leadership seemed to wish for more imperialist interference in the region rather than less. Mulla Mustafa Barzani repeatedly expressed his warm feelings for the United States, which he wanted Kurdistan to join as the fifty-first state, and to which he was willing to grant control of the oil in Kurdistan in exchange for support. The movement was gradually purged of leftist elements and it seemed that the traditional leaders, whose authority had at first been challenged by young urban nationalists, were able to consolidate or recuperate their positions as a consequence of their participation in the movement. T he vast majority of Iraqi Kurds supported Barzani in these attitudes. His more leftist rivals were followed by a small minority only. The Kurdish movement thus seemed to contrast with another liberation movement of a largely tribal people, that of the Dhofaris in Oman. This movement had the reputation of being very revolutionary; it was one of the favourites of the leftist press, as the Kurdish movement was that of the conservative British and American press. There were two obvious reasons for this difference: the former movement fought a reactionary, oppressive, pro-Western regime, the second an authori¬ tarian, reformist, oppressive, pro-Soviet regime, and the leadership in both movements had completely different backgrounds. But did these two factors alone explain the difference? It seemed to me that there must also be internal reasons why the Kurdish movement in Iraq became more openly conservative during 1964-66. Towhat degree did tribal organization and other 'primordial loyalties' (Alavi 1973) prevent poor peasants from defending their own rights against tribal chieftains and landlords, and make them fight for interests not their own? Were these loyalties breaking down, and if so, how and under what circumstances? What precisely was the impact of imperialism on traditional Kurdish society, and could this explain the nature of the Kurdish movement? These and similar questions were at the back of my mind when I started preparing fieldwork (1973). I decided to concentrate on traditional power relations at the local level and the effect of increasing state control and incorporation into the world market on class relations and on the class consciousness of the middle and poor peasantry in particular. I intended to do this in the form of a rather traditional anthropological study, staying for a Religion Most Kurds are orthodox Sunni Muslims, and among the four schools of Islamic law they foUow the Shafi'i rite. They thus distinguish themselves from their non-Kurdish neighbours: the Turks of Turkey and the Arabs Uving to the immediate south of Kurdistan are in majority also Sunni Muslims, but follow the Hanafi legal school; Azeri Turks, Persians and Lurs are Shiites. Not aU Kurds, however, are Sunnis and Shafi'is. On the southern and southeastern fringes of Kurdistan (in the provinces of Khanaqin and Kermanshah) several large Kurdish tribes, and probably even a majority of the Kurdish population there, embrace the orthodox Twelver Shiism which is the official religion in Iran. The Shiite Kurds of Iran-have always kept aloof when their Sunni brothers further north engaged in nationalist activities, as in the 1920s, 1946 and the past few years since 1979. Among those in Iraq there was in the 1960s and 1970s an increasing level of participation in nationalist politics, however. The reUgious factor, aUhough important, therefore does not seem to be decisive by itself in the political aUiances and oppositions (cf. Bruinessen 1981). Beside orthodox Shiite and Sunni Islam, we find in various parts of Kurdistan the adherents of heterodox, syncretistic sects, in which traces of older Iranian and Semitic religions, extremist Shiism (ghulat) and heterodox Sufism may be detected. ^The largest group is that of the Alevis, in northwestern Kurdistan. The degree of heterodoxy varies, some groups have long been under the influence of Sunni pressure and propaganda; others, notably those of Dersim, can hardly be caUed Islamic at aU. ^It has often been noted that most of the Kurdish Alevis speak Zaza dialects. This is true, but there are also Kurmanji speaking Alevis, while the majority of the Alevis in Turkey are not Kurds but Turks. Conversely, only a fraction of the Zaza-speakers are Alevis. In southern and southeasternKurdistan one finds pockets of another heterodox sect, the Ahl-e Haqq ('People of the Truth'), or, as they are caUed in Iraq, Kakai. The present Ahl-e Haqq communities m Kurdistan, around Sahne east of Kermanshah, around Kerend west of Kermanshah, and in the districts south of Kirkuk, seem to be the remnants of a much larger community all over the area that is now southern Kurdistan and Lorestan. Many of the two last named communities speak Gurani dialects, which is interesting given a similar association of Zaza dialects and Alevism. Here too, the association is very incomplete: not aU Gurani speakers are Ahl-e Haqq, and many Ahl-e Haqq are Azeri Turks or Persians. The Alevis and Ahl-e Haqq share a beUef in reincarnation and in successive incarnations of the divinity in human form, and many of their rites are similar. 2"The third heterodox sect is that of the Yezidis (Ezidi in Kurdish), often abusively and incorrectly caUed 'devU-worshippers'. Although ostensibly originating as an extremist Sunni sect, it has many traits in to oppose Barzani; from 1966 on, they were even regularly engaged in combat with Barzani'smen. The latter accused Talabani of coUaborating with the government and began calling him by the insulting name for Kurdish mercenaries, jash ('donkey foal'). It is not clear how far these accusations were true at that time. Talabani was in a difficult position and had to manoeuvre carefully. He did have his supporters in the area, but Barzani had also gradually become powerful in southern Kurdistan. Talabani was therefore surrounded by enemies: Barzani's men to the north, the army and Kurdish mercenaries to the west and south. After al-Bakr's coup (July 1968), Talabani was quick to negotiate with the new president, who wished a settlement of the Kurdish question. Apparently expecting important political gains, Talabani joined forces with the government in its last attempts to subdue Barzani, which did not help to make him popular among the Kurdish public. Al-Bakr recognized that a settlement of the Kurdish question would not be possible without Barzani. The 11 March agreement not only brought Kurds peace and the promise of autonomy, it also consolidated Barzani's hold of Iraqi Kurdistan. Talabani and all of Barzani's tribal enemies had no choice but reconcile themselves with him, at least temporarily. i. -, The 11 March agreement stipulated a period of four years m which its terms had to be implemented. Some of the promises were carried out almost immediately: five Kurdish representatives were made cabinet ministers in Baghdad, a land reform was carried out (affecting, I gather, especiaUy those landlords who had collaborated with Baghdad!), health care was extended to the most remote districts, and Kurdish education made rapid progress: many new schools were established, a curriculum in Kurdish was developed and a Kurdish Academy of Sciences was founded. On the most sensitive issue, the estabUshment of an autonomous Kurdish region, much less progress was made. The government and the Kurds never reached consensus on the delimitation of this region: the Kurds demanded that the oil-rich districts of Kirkuk and Khanaqin, where the Kurds then comprised the majority of the population, be included. The central government was understandably reluctant, not wiUing to delegate control over so vital a resource. Instead, the government began 'arabizing' the district, forcibly expelhng Kurds and replacing them with Arabs. This has to be seen, however, against the background of international developments. Iraq felt threatened by Iran's imperial ambitions and was engaged in a confrontation with the West. In 1971, after the last British troops had puUed back from the Gulf, Iran tried to fill the power vacuum and occupied the islands in the Straits of Hormuz that control access to the Gulf. The relations between Iraq and Iran, which had never been good since the Shah's ahnost open miUtary support of the Iraqi Kurds, fiarther deteriorated. In the same year, 1971, Iraq nationalized the instaUations of the (British-Dutch-French-American) Iraq Petrol Company, to which Index