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This year's Chorley lecture examines certain theoretical and practical questions concerning political representation in constitutional democracies and advances three claims. (1) That electocracy (rule by elections) reduces the role of citizens to a series of discrete choice points, often shifting the actual moment of choice to the politician. (2) That a preoccupation with winner‐take‐all elections encourages representatives in the US to see themselves as powerful strangers with a proprietary interest in their position. (3) That representatives can deepen democracy by functioning as catalysts for citizen involvement not just surrogates for citizen views or identities. Drawing on historic and contemporary examples of ordinary people who mobilize collectively to build new forms of citizen power before and after elections, Professor Guinier adapts the framework of collective efficacy to describe this conceptual move. She argues that vibrant constituencies of accountability can transform the representational relationship to reimagine democracy as self‐governance not just self‐government.
Lani Guinier (Tue,) studied this question.