RETHINKING THE RESOURCE CURSE: Ownership Structure, Institutional Capacity, and Domestic Constraints

▪ Abstract Most political scientists and economists unequivocally accept the proposition that abundant mineral resources are more often a curse than a blessing, particularly for developing countries. We argue that the widely accepted contention that an abundance of mineral resources and the influx of external rents generated from these resources during boom periods are to blame for the so-called “resource curse” should be revisited. Instead, we offer a new research agenda for studying the problem of resource-rich states that shifts the locus of study away from the “paradox of plenty” to a more appropriate paradox—that the concentration of wealth impoverishes the state whereas the dispersion of wealth enriches the state. This agenda focuses on three interrelated issues: the structure of ownership over mineral resources, the importance of strong institutions, and the relative influence of domestic versus international factors.