Qatar and Expanded Contours of Small State Diplomacy

Abstract It is increasingly obvious that Qatar is playing above its weight in the international role. There is no one script that defines Qatar's diplomatic role. It is best seen as a maverick, willing to work with the US as well as Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. It operates a complex form of public diplomacy via Al-Jazeera and other high profile initiatives at the same time as it mediates behind the scenes with Israel and Lebanon. Qatar's role as a unique hybrid diplomatic actor is reinforced by the enthusiastic support it displayed towards the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, including operational support for the UN Security Resolution to place a no-fly zone with respect to the Qaddafi's regime, while being more circumspect on the uprising in Bahrain. Such an extensive, unconventional and differentiated approach creates risks as well as opportunities. Yet, through a combination of resources and vision, it is skilled resilience not vulnerability that defines Qatar. 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Rachman, “How Small States Were Cut Adrift”, Financial Times, 20 October 2009. 12 Ibid. 13 “World Cup Bid Win had Smart Brains Behind it’, The Peninsular, 11 March 2011. 14 G. Abraham, “Qatar is Diplomatic Heavy-Hitter”, Al Jazeera. net, 21 July 2008. http: //english. aljazeera. net/focus/2008/07/200872164735567644. html 15 The other Gulf trade office was in Oman and would later close in 2000 after the onset of the Palestinians’ second intifada against the Israelis. 16 “Israel Business Delegation in Qatar, Trade Office to Open”, Dow Jones International News, 27 May 1996. 17 A. Lyons, “Mideast Peace Logjam Blocks Arab-Israel Business”, Reuters, 12 Nov. 1997. 18 “Israel Holds Talks With Qatar”, BBC News, 14 May 2003, http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/middleₑast/3027909. stm 19 “Arab Nations Quietly Bridge the Trade Gulf with Israelis”, The Times Online, 7 April 2006. 20 On the lighter side, soon after this meeting Qatar gave a reported USD 10 million to help build a soccer stadium for Arab Israelis. The 13, 000 seat Doha Stadium was built in 2005 in the northern town of Sakhnin for the Bnei Sakhnin soccer team. The mixed Arab and Jewish team, which had won the 2004 Israeli State cup, has often been used as a model of binational co-existence. Ibid. 21 “Security Council has been Idle During Lebanese ‘Bloodbath’ — League of Arab States”, UN News Center, 8 August 2006, http: //www. un. org/apps/news/story. asp? NewsID=19433&Cr=leban&Cr1= 22 “A Bouncy Bantam”, The Economist, 7 September 2006. 23 Ibid. 24 G. Abraham, “Qatar is Diplomatic Heavy-Hitter”, Al Jazeera. net, 21 July 2008. 25 S. Wright, “Foreign Policies with Global Reach: The Case of Qatar”, The Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States. 26 B. Ravid, “Qatar Willing to Broker Cease-Fire Agreement Between Israel and Hamas”, Ha'aretz, 25 Feb. 2008, http: //www. haaretz. com/hasen/spages/957777. html 27 Ibid. 28 “Israel Foreign Minister in Qatar to Discuss Peace”, Gulf News. com, 13 April 2008, http: //www. gulfnews. com/news/gulf/qatar/10205322. html 29 J. Krane, “For Qatar, Bold Moves Including Outreach to Israel”, Associated Press, 9 November 2006. 30 See U. Rabi “Qatar's Relations with Israel an Exemplar of an Independent Foreign Policy”, Tel Aviv Notes, 7 October 2008, http: //www. dayan. org/Qatar. pdf 31 K. Byrd and T. Kawarabayashi, “Al-Jazeera – ‘The Opinion, and the Other Opinion’ – Sustaining a Free Press in the Middle East”, Media in Transition, 2–4 May 2003, 10. 32 Bahry, “The New Arab Media”, 88–99. 33 “A Bouncy Bantam”, The Economist, 7 September 2006. 34 R. F. Worth and D. D. Kirkpatrick, “Seizing a Moment, Al Jazeera Galvanizes Arab Frustration”, New York Times, 27 January 2011. 35 A. Koppel, “War on Iraq has Affected U. S. Alliances”, CNN Washington Bureau on the Web, 9 May 2003, http: //www. cnn. com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/05/09/us. allies/ 36 Qatar spent USD 100 million on hurricane relief and donated a USD 17. 5 million grant to black-dominated Xavier University in New Orleans. “A Bouncy Bantam”, The Economist, 7 September 2006. 37 J. Krane, “For Qatar, Bold Moves Including Outreach to Israel”, Associated Press, 9 November 2006. 38 “Qatar Gives 22 million for Palestinian Teachers”, Khaleej Times, 7 May 2007. 39 “A Bouncy Bantam”, The Economist, 7 September 2006. 40 Ibid. 41 “The Arabs’ View of Iran: Mixed Feelings”, The Economist, 16 July 2009. 42 D. Roberts, “Explaining Qatar's Schizophrenic Foreign Policy’”, Egypt Daily News, 28 April 2009, http: //www. thedailynewsegypt. com/article. aspx? ArticleID=21350 43 G. Abraham, “Qatar is Diplomatic Heavy-Hitter”, Al Jazeera. net, 21 July 2008. 44 Interestingly, the Iraqi Multinational Force even noted that Saddam Hussein's widow “… is a major source of guidance, logistical support, and funding for Iraq's insurgent leadership. She has established significant connections to individuals directing the insurgency in Iraq and has access to substantial assets stolen by Saddam Hussein. ” “Iraqi Government Releases ‘41 Most Wanted’ List”, Official Website of the Multi-National Force, 3 July 2006, http: //www. mnf-iraq. com/index. php? option=comcontent&task=view&id=572&Itemid=46 45 J. Zacharia, “For Qatar, Relations with West are a Balancing Act”, The New York Times, 4 March 2008, http: //www. nytimes. com/2008/03/04/world/africa/04iht-letter5. 1. 10686376. html? scp=1&sq=qatar%20and%20relations&st=cse 46 M. Nizza, “Recipe to End a Libyan Standoff”, New York Times, 24 July 2007. 47 Ramthall and Schulze. “Political Reform in the Gulf”, 47–62. 48 Kamrava, “Power Realignment”, 6. Note the term has also been used to explain the EUs approach to international politics. See Sjursen, “What Kind of Power? ”, 169–81. 49 S. 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