The Dynamical Alternative

Abstract What is cognition? Contemporary orthodoxy maintains that it is computation: the mind is a special kind of computer, and cognitive processes are the internal manipulation of symbolic representations. This broad idea has dominated the philosophy and the rhetoric of cognitive science-and even, to a large extent, its practice-ever since the field emerged from the postwar cybernetic melee. Many arguments have been advanced in its favor, and perhaps equally many against it. For a number of years, the situation has been one of stalemate, for generally neither computationalists nor their opponents have found each other’s arguments convincing. There is no doubt, however, that for a long time computationalists maintained a strategic advantage, for their opponents were unable to provide an alternative conception that could match computationalism in empirical scope and theoretical well-foundedness. Computationalists could thus always fall back on what has become known as the “what else could it be?” argument.