Assessing the Effects of Information Disclosure Requirements

S NE continuing manifestation of consumerism is the increase in legislative and regulatory requirements for disclosure of product information. The pressure for additional information shows no signs of abating,' although the focus of the pressure is certainly changing. For the past five years the greatest emphasis has been on information about ingredients, relative prices, safety, and the useful life of products. The future will see greater attention paid to disclosures of efficiency and comparative performance information2 on a much broader array of products. Table 1 illustrates the scope of present and probable future requirements. A curious feature of the growing demand for more information is the paucity of concrete evidence that past disclosures have made significant differences in consumer or market behavior. And if the future is like the past, there will be little or no programmatic research available to help decision makers forecast the impact of new disclosure requirements.3 The lack of evidence on the behavioral effects of information disclosures is due to the relative newness of most requirements and the inherent difficulties of designing and implementing the appropriate evaluation research.4 These factors are compounded by a lack of conceptual bases for understanding how buyers use informations and confusion as to the objectives to be served by providing additional information. Without specific agreed-upon objectives there is no basis for a subsequent determination of success or failure. Yet there is seldom agreement among proponents as to whether new requirements should simply enhance the consumer's right to know, improve the quality of products and competition, facilitate value comparisons, enable buyers to better match products and needs and thus increase purchase satisfaction, or pursue broad educational aims such as creating general public interest in nutrition or sensitivity to energy conservation. 1. See generally, Hans B. Thorelli, Information Systems of the Future (Distinguished Lecture in Marketing, York University, 1972); William L. Wilkie and David M. Gardner, Marketing Research Inputs to Public Policy: The Case of the FTC, JOURNAL OF MARKETING, Vol. 38 (January 1974), pp. 38-47; William A. French and Hiram C. Barksdale, Food Labeling Regulations: Efforts Toward Disclosure, JOURNAL OF MARKETING, Vol. 38 (July 1974), pp. 14-19; William C. Whitford, Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions, Wisconsin Law Review (No. 2, 1973), p. 403; and Gwen Bymers, Seller-Buyer Communication: Point of View of a Family Economist, Journal of Home Economics, Vol. 64 (February 1972), p. 59. 2. George S. Day, Full Disclosure of Comparative Performance Information to Consumers: Problems and Prospects, Journal of Contemporary Business, Vol. 4 (January 1975), pp. 53-68. 3. The major exceptions to this pattern have been the research on nutrient labeling and open dating. See Monroe Peter Friedman, Responses to Unit Pricing, Open Dating and Nutrient Labeling, in Proceedings of the Association for Consumer Research, M. Venkatesan, ed. (Chicago, 1972), pp. 361-369. 4. George S. Day and William K. Brandt, Research and the Evaluation of Public Policy: The Case of Truth in Lending, Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 1 (June 1974), pp. 21-32. 5. William L. Wilkie, Assessment of Consumer Information Processing Research in Relation to Public Policy Needs (Report to the National Science Foundation, 1974). Journal of Marketing, Vol. 40 (April 1976), pp. 42-52.