Key points are not available for this paper at this time.
Between 2009 and 2011, there was an intense debate in UK, Canadian, and Australian military intelligence circles regarding two putatively competing doctrinal concepts, the U.S.-originated “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” and the United Kingdom’s “intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance.” The inclusion, or not, of target acquisition proved a flashpoint for a wider and deeper range of existing concerns about the organizational and doctrinal relationships between intelligence and operations in a military command staff. These, in turn, reflected a more fundamental and ongoing transformation in that relationship arising from “revolution in military affairs” during the 1990s. The article traces the debate up to its premature termination by fiat in 2011 and concludes that these issues remain to be properly addressed in UK and allied intelligence doctrine.
Philip H. J. Davies (Wed,) studied this question.