Guo Xiang 郭象 made an innovative development of the Zhuangzian no-self view. This paper analyzes Guo's conception of the self through the lens of contemporary metaphysics, arguing that his rejection of the conventional understanding of the self for ordinary people corresponds with presentist four-dimensionalism. By asserting that the previous self is not the present self, Guo rejected the notion of an enduring self across time. This idea corresponds with the four-dimensionalist account of persistence. By claiming that the previous self has already vanished, Guo denied the existence of the past self. This view supports a presentist claim that only present things exist. In the presentist four-dimensionalist framework, we can understand how Guo provided a more radical interpretation of the Zhuangzian no-self view better: the presentist four-dimensionalist conception of the self deconstructs both the enduring self and the past self, thereby expanding the no-self view to include ordinary people.
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Linhe Han
Xinyi Zhan
Asian Philosophy
Peking University
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Han et al. (Mon,) studied this question.
www.synapsesocial.com/papers/68d913b24ddcf71ba560bfc9 — DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2025.2563412
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