Experimental validation of the RESPONSE framework against cyberattacks on cyber‐physical process systems

Abstract This work experimentally validates the RESPONSE (Resilient Process cONtrol SystEm) framework as a solution for maintaining safe, continuous operation of cyber‐physical process systems under cyberattacks. RESPONSE implements a dual‐loop architecture that runs a networked online controller in parallel with a hard‐isolated offline controller, augmented by a control‐action monitor and controller state reconfiguration for bumpless transfer. Using a laboratory continuous stirred‐tank heater (CSTH), we emulate integrity (false‐data injection) and availability (DDoS) attacks, and benchmark RESPONSE against a parallel unconnected redundancy without controller reconfiguration across different controller tunings. Experiments show that RESPONSE (i) sustains stable operation without enforced shutdown when detection is delayed or absent, (ii) suppresses switching transients via integral/state manipulation, and (iii) accelerates restoration because the plant remains near set conditions. These results demonstrate a practical pathway to retrofit legacy systems with minimal modification, operationalizing the “respond/recover” functions of modern cybersecurity guidance directly within the control architecture.