Intuitive and deliberate decisions can be accounted for by the same cognitive process model

Abstract A central open question in research on intuitive and deliberate cognitive processing is whether both can be captured by adaptations within a single cognitive mechanism or require distinct computational processes. We test whether interactive activation processes, proposed as general models of cognition, can account for both intuitive and deliberate decisions. In an online experiment ( N = 128), we analyzed the effects of decision-mode instructions in a probabilistic inference task using a computational modeling approach. The manipulation of decision mode was successful as indicated by substantial changes in decision time and subjective experience of conscious decision-making. The manipulation, however, did not influence the distribution of decision strategies. There was no indication that more serial, rule-based, as opposed to holistic, associative (i.e., coherence-based) processes were used under a deliberation instruction. In both conditions, a Parallel Constraint Satisfaction (PCS) model for decision-making, which is based on interactive activation processes, accounted best for the data for the majority of participants. Deliberation increased the quality of the choices measured as adherence to a rational standard. In the deliberation mode, the observed patterns of response times and confidence were more in line with the predictions of the PCS model than under an intuitive instruction. Our results are consistent with an integrated processes perspective, suggesting that coherence-based mechanisms can account for behavior under both intuitive and deliberate decision modes.