The advancement of rural urbanization has led to a steady increase in construction and demolition waste (CDW) in rural areas; its dispersed nature complicates management efforts, yet existing research has not sufficiently explored the synergistic effects of subsidies and transportation costs. In this paper, a Stackelberg game model is constructed among the government, farmers, and manufacturers within the framework of a reward–penalty mechanism (RPM), and rural governance efficiency is introduced to characterize regulatory enforcement losses. Furthermore, on the basis of existing research and discussions with experts in the construction industry, this study conducted numerical simulations of key parameters by integrating multiple data sources and calibrating parameters. The aim was to analyze the mechanisms through which key factors—such as differences in subsidy structures and transportation costs—influence the decision-making behavior of farmers and manufacturers, as well as the equilibrium outcomes of the supply chain. The results indicate that (1) the reward–penalty mechanism has a significant and nonlinear effect on the decision-making of the parties involved; (2) although subsidy intensity promotes technological investment, its impact on revenue and pricing varies because of transportation cost constraints; (3) the proportion of additional subsidies for farmers is key to policy coordination, and a reasonable subsidy structure can simultaneously improve both economic and environmental performance; and (4) as a key constraint, farmers’ transportation costs play a significant moderating role in the effectiveness of regulatory measures. This paper reveals the decision-making mechanisms of rural CDW resource recovery supply chains under multiple constraints from a farmer-led perspective, providing a reference for promoting rural CDW resource recovery.
Liu et al. (Wed,) studied this question.