Study examines the interplay between political motivations and the formulation of economic policy in the state decision-making process that initiated radical market reforms in Russia in October 1991. Employing the historical-genetic method, the research evaluates the role of external and internal factors that predetermined the choice of market transformation programs. The abstract-logical method is applied to identify distortions in the original reform blueprint following Yeltsin’s policy address to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on October 28, 1991. The study demonstrates that by autumn 1991, the country stood on the brink of a systemic political crisis. This crisis unfolded under two interrelated circumstances: the collapse of the anti-Union coalition in the Russian parliament and the persistent influence of anti-Yeltsin forces at the regional level. In this context, holding regional, territorial, and republican elections risked institutionalizing state fragmentation and paralyzing central authority. The presidency faced the imperative to retain emergency powers for appointing regional administrative heads and secure a temporary moratorium on elections. The response was a shift toward rapid market transformation. Key features of this decision included the announcement of price liberalization, a pro-Western orientation in the presidential program, and Yeltsin’s assumption of the premiership. While these measures enabled the launch of reforms and the suspension of regional elections through a consolidated act of government branches, subsequent developments—such as the collapse of consumer markets and the need to align with Western states and international organizations—rendered the original reform agenda unfeasible within the declared timeframe.
Ilya Sergeevich Logvenkov (Wed,) studied this question.