U.S. planning and implementation of post-war transformation in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's Government (May 2003 – June 2004)

Background. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to significant shifts in the international political landscape of the Middle East and laid the groundwork for a series of protracted conflicts in the region. Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, the United States set out to establish a stable representative government in Iraq and to prevent the country from becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups. This article examines the key strategic decisions made by the George W. Bush administration in the framework of post-war reconstruction. Particular attention is given to the implementation of the concept of nation-building, which faced growing criticism in American society following the perceived failures of the wars in Iraq (2003–2011) and Afghanistan (2001–2021). The findings of this study are significant for understanding the evolution of U.S. foreign policy in the post-bipolar era and are also relevant for Ukraine, which currently receives U.S. support in countering Russian aggression. Methods. This article is an empirical study based on primary sources. The principal methodological approach employed is the principle of historicism, which requires that past events and phenomena be examined within the context of the specific historical conditions of their emergence and development. The historical-genetic method was used to trace changes in the conceptual foundations of the U.S. government's approach to Iraq's post-war transformation and the means of its implementation. Results. This study analyzes the evolution of the U.S. approach to Iraq's post-war transformation by examining conceptual frameworks developed during the pre-invasion planning phase and comparing them with the actual policies implemented by the George W. Bush administration. The consequences of key decisions adopted by the U.S. government following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime are traced and assessed. Conclusions. Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government in April 2003, Iraq's post-war reconstruction was conducted under the unilateral control of the United States. U.S. policy was implemented through the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), a governmental body within the U.S. Department of Defense. Conceptual planning for Iraq's post-conflict transformation began a year prior to the invasion, primarily under the auspices of the State Department. The political components of the planning emphasized the depoliticization of the Iraqi army and state bureaucracy to prevent the return of regime loyalists to power. However, the Bush administration radically altered this course by initiating a far more extensive process of purging the state apparatus and military. These actions led to the collapse of Iraq's socio-political structure and increased support for insurgent groups. The United States was unable to suppress the insurgency swiftly due to the limited size of its military contingent – an outcome of the administration's effort to reduce military and financial expenditures.